

Zdeněk Rod:¹ The Changing European Security Architecture – The Czech View

Executive Summary

- The Russian invasion of Ukraine has compelled Europe, including the Czech Republic, to reorient its security and defence posture towards the demands of high-intensity conflict. Since 2022, Prague has adopted new strategic documents, increased defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP, launched substantial procurement programmes, and assumed a leadership role in allied support for Ukraine, most notably through the international ammunition initiative.
- Nonetheless, Czech defence policy continues to grapple with significant challenges: political polarisation over military investments, limited public support for higher defence expenditure, persistent recruitment difficulties, and enduring infrastructure and interoperability shortfalls. NATO's recent commitment to raise spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035 amplifies these pressures, requiring structural reform and more extensive societal engagement.
- The Czech case highlights both the potential and the vulnerability of small states within European security: capable of exercising leadership through targeted initiatives, yet constrained by domestic political, social, and fiscal factors that threaten to erode long-term strategic ambition.

Not only threat perceptions, but the European security landscape itself has also significantly transformed since 2022. Building on the lessons learnt from more than three and a half years of intense warfare in our immediate neighbourhood, this analysis provides an overview and assessment of the Czech answers to the pressing dilemmas and tasks in the defense realm, also looking ahead to the upcoming parliamentary elections and their potential effects to Czech defense policy.

Introduction

The Russian military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally altered the European discourse on security. The outbreak of high-intensity warfare on the continent revealed the degree to which Ukraine, NATO and European states were ill-prepared to deter Moscow effectively. Since then, a substantial body of scholarly and policy-oriented literature has emerged, interrogating the reasons behind this lack of preparedness and exploring the ways in which European armed forces might strengthen their defence and deterrence posture. This debate unfolds against a paradoxical backdrop: while Russia has sustained significant battlefield losses, its military-industrial base – contrary to early predictions of imminent collapse – has not only endured but expanded.² Indeed, Russia is currently producing more artillery ammunition than all NATO member states in Europe combined. Although the Russian system is

beset with profound structural weaknesses, it has nevertheless oriented itself towards a protracted war of attrition. In response, the vast majority of European NATO allies have been compelled to re-elevate defence to the forefront of their political and strategic priorities.

The Czech position towards the evolving European security architecture has been broadly consistent with that of its allies. Following nearly two decades of pronounced underinvestment in defence – during

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² Zdeněk Rod: [Ruský vojensko-průmyslový komplex ve stínu Andreje Belousova: Speerovský technokrat Putinovy éry](#) [The Russian Military-Industrial Complex in the Shadow of Andrei Belousov: The Speerian Technocrat of the Putin Era] [online] 18 06 2025 Source: CEVRO University [30 09 2025]



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which, in 2014, expenditure fell to below 1 per cent of GDP³ – Czechia entered a period of strategic recalibration. The government of Prime Minister Petr Fiala, in office since November 2021, has presided over a decisive turn in defence policy. This shift has been reflected not only in rhetorical commitments but also in concrete policy measures and practical adaptations designed to align Czech defence posture with the demands of the transformed European security environment.

As outlined earlier⁴, Prague has undertaken a notable strategic reorientation. In 2023, Czechia adopted new security and defence strategies that unambiguously identified Russia as a major threat to national security, while also designating the People's Republic of China as a significant security challenge, alongside a range of others. Crucially, both documents underscored the imperative of preparing the Czech security apparatus for the prospect of high-intensity warfare, as demonstrated so vividly on the battlefields of Ukraine. This marked a significant departure for the Czech Armed Forces (CAF), which, since joining NATO on 12 March 1999, had been primarily oriented towards counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and peace-support operations in theatres such as Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mali. The war in Ukraine, however, has laid bare the limitations of such a posture: modern state defence requires mass mobilisation, substantial conventional capabilities, and technological innovation, notably in the fields of artificial intelligence and the employment of unmanned aerial systems, particularly drones.

Second, in order to translate strategic ambitions into practice, the Czech government succeeded, by the end of 2024, in raising defence expenditure to 2 per cent of GDP—a milestone achieved only through considerable political and fiscal effort⁵. This financial commitment has underpinned a series of major procurement programmes, including the acquisition of 24 fifth-generation F-35 fighter aircraft, CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, 77 Leopard 2A8 main battle tanks, eight UH-1Y Venom and four AH-1Z Viper helicopters, SPYDER air defence systems, more than 800 Tatra T-815 trucks, and 62 Caesar self-propelled howitzers, among others. In parallel, the Czech Armed Forces (CAF) have embarked upon an ambitious recruitment drive, with the objective of expanding their ranks to 30,000 professional soldiers (from the current 24,000) and 10,000 reservists (from 2,400) by 2030⁶. Yet, despite these initiatives, the challenge of sustaining adequate recruitment levels remains a persistent concern.

Third, Czechia has demonstrated that even a small state in international politics can assume a consequential role in strengthening Ukraine's military capacity. The Czech ammunition initiative stands as a prominent example of such efforts. Increasingly, Prague has positioned itself as an adaptive and forward-looking NATO ally, displaying both initiative and leadership in addressing critical capability gaps. Its stewardship of the 155mm artillery shell initiative – coordinating a coalition of eighteen states to procure up to 800,000 rounds from non-EU suppliers – reflects strategic foresight and political resolve. While more than one-third of the planned munitions have already been delivered, the programme continues to face structural challenges, ranging from persistent funding constraints to complex logistical demands and technical issues associated with ageing stockpiles.⁷

Yet, despite the launch of several crucial initiatives, a number of challenges continue to shape the debate on Czech defence in 2025. First, political consensus remains elusive: opposition parties, most notably ANO under former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, have sharply criticised the government's policies – particularly the procurement of F-35 fighter aircraft – and signalled that, should they return to power, initiatives such as the Czech ammunition programme would be discontinued. Second, recent public opinion surveys indicate a general lack of societal interest in security and defence issues, coupled with marked reluctance to endorse higher levels of defence spending, which are projected to rise to 3 per cent of GDP by 2030. Third, allies at The Hague NATO summit agreed on new capability targets, raising significant questions as to how the Czech government emerging from the October 2025 parliamentary elections will

³ Pavel OTTO: [Závazek NATO o výdajích na obranu splní Česko hrou s položkami. Sporné mohou být miliardy](#) [The Czech Republic will fulfill NATO's commitment to defense spending by playing with items. Billions may be at stake], [online] 29 11 2023 Source: e15.cz [30 09 2025]

⁴ Zdeněk ROD: [The Czech Defence outlook after the Russian invasion to Ukraine](#). *Analyses in Strategic and Defense Studies*, 2024/16. [online] 27 09 2024 Source: uni-nke.hu [30 09 2025]

⁵ ČTK: [Česku se v loňském roce podařilo dávat dvě procenta HDP na obranu](#) [Last year, the Czech Republic managed to allocate two percent of its GDP to defense] [online] 06 01 2025 Source: Seznam zprávy [30 09 2025]

⁶ ROD, 2024: Ibid.

⁷ Zdeněk ROD – Michael JARKOVSKÝ: [Czechia's quiet struggle for artillery shells holds lessons for Europe](#). [online] 04 11 2025 Source: Defense News [30 09 2025]; James BLACK – Ondřej PALICKA – Zdeněk ROD: [EU should buy ammo outside of the bloc to quickly resupply Ukraine](#). [online] 04 04 2024 Source: RAND Corporation [30 09 2025]



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approach their implementation. Fourth, recruitment efforts for both professional soldiers and reservists continue to fall short of expectations. Fifth, difficulties have emerged across a number of procurement projects, including concerns about the quality of delivered military equipment.

Against this backdrop of unresolved questions, the following analysis will examine each of these issues in greater detail, offering context for those seeking to understand the trajectory of Czech defence and security policy in 2025.

Political Rivalries over Czech Defence

One of the key aspects of the defence policy of any liberal-democratic state is political consensus on security and defence affairs. The reasons are manifold. First, defence planning and military build-up are long-term processes (10+ years) that require continuity and stability. A long-term vision and strategy are therefore essential. Second, allies must share a common understanding of the threats they face, which fosters a unified political will to respond. Third, unity within the political domain is a prerequisite for credible deterrence⁸, especially in an era of hybrid interference aimed at polarizing political actors over critical defence and security issues. Finally, political unity also signals to NATO allies that we are a credible long-term partner.

Czech political parties are currently divided into three broad camps, which struggle to find common ground on defence. The first camp consists of the governing coalition – comprising of SPOLU (the centre-right alliance of ODS, KDU-ČSL, and TOP 09) and STAN – together with the Pirates, who left government following the collapse of the digitalisation agenda. This camp has been the principal architect of the post-2022 defence policy, advocating both the procurement of advanced capabilities, notably the fifth-generation F-35 fighter aircraft, and a steady increase in defence expenditure, with the ambition of reaching 5 per cent of GDP by 2035.⁹

The second camp is represented by the largest opposition force, ANO, led by Andrej Babiš, which is also the strongest party in the Chamber of Deputies with 71 out of 200 seats and the most likely contender to return to power. ANO has adopted a more critical stance towards government defence policy. Andrej Babiš criticized the Czech Ministry of Defence for a lack of transparency and competition in military procurement, pointing especially to the F-35 purchase and failed tenders for armored vehicles. He rejected NATO's new proposal to raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP plus 1.5% for related projects by 2035, and called Donald Trump's idea of 5% GDP 'absolutely unacceptable'. Babiš argued the Czech government only met the 2% NATO target through advance payments, and suggested selling the F-35s to Israel. He claimed open tenders are rare, often end in delays or cancellations, and that the ministry 'doesn't compete anything'. Smaller tenders exist, but even they face problems with specifications or delivery.¹⁰

Moreover, ANO MP and security specialist Robert Králíček¹¹ has publicly questioned the realism of such commitments. Importantly, ANO's critique does not amount to an outright rejection of strengthening national defence; rather, it reflects a broader conception of security, one that encompasses hybrid threats and emphasises the need for a more balanced distribution of resources across the entire national security sector – including the police, fire and rescue services, and the prison system – rather than concentrating predominantly on the armed forces. Should ANO return to office, therefore, the current emphasis on military modernisation may well be recalibrated in favour of a more comprehensive approach to both internal and external security.

The third significant camp in Czech defence debates is represented by the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) movement, led by Tomio Okamura. The SPD has positioned itself in staunch opposition to NATO's new commitment – endorsed by the Czech government – to increase defence expenditure to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035. Party representatives argue that such a substantial rise, amounting to tens of

⁸ [NATO's evolving strategy: progress, challenges, and the future of deterrence](#). [online] 19 12 2024 Source: Swedish Defense Agency [30 09 2025]

⁹ [Bezpečné Česko & účinná obrana](#) [Safe Czechia & Effective Defence] [online] 2025 Source: SPOLU [30 09 2025]

¹⁰ Jakub SAMEK: [Obrana nesoutěží, kritizuje Babiš. Pod ANO by mohl nastat obrat](#) [Defense is not competing, criticizes Babiš. A turnaround could occur under ANO]. In: *Security Magazín*, June 2025. [online] 26 06 2025 Source: [Securitymagazin.cz](#) [30 09 2025]

¹¹ Bod zlomu: [Na hybridní hrozby, hybridní obrany](#) [On hybrid threats, hybrid defence] [online] 07 08 2025 Source: YouTube [30 09 2025]



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billions of crowns annually, would inevitably divert resources away from already underfunded sectors such as healthcare, education, pensions, and social services. They further contend that the government accepted this obligation without meaningful public or expert deliberation, even as many NATO member states continue to fall short of the original 2 per cent benchmark. While the SPD affirms its support for a robust national defence, it rejects what it terms 'reckless and dictated' military spending, insisting instead that genuine security rests upon a resilient society, a sound economy, and the well-being of citizens, rather than upon tanks and aircraft alone.¹²

In addition to mainstream and far-right voices, the ultra-left political movement Stačilo!, led by Communist Party chair Kateřina Konečná, which will probably gain several parliamentary seats after October elections, has also entered the debate. Konečná has argued publicly that the European Union is 'on the verge of collapse', denounced NATO as 'an aggressive pact', and called for an end to military assistance to Ukraine. She has further advocated the introduction of a referendum law that would enable votes on issues such as Czech withdrawal from NATO, departure from the EU, or adoption of the euro.¹³

One must also take into account the imminence of the parliamentary elections scheduled for 3–4 October. The political atmosphere is highly charged, and the tenor of the debate reflects the polarisation typical of the pre-election period. Any serious analyst must remain mindful of the distinction between pre-election rhetoric and the more pragmatic compromises that often emerge in the post-election environment. Nonetheless, the current debates reveal enduring intellectual vectors within the Czech party system regarding defence policy, making it difficult to envisage a radically different discourse after the election.

Declining public interest in defence

Another pressing concern is the persistently low level of public willingness to defend Czechia. A STEM survey¹⁴ conducted in June 2025 indicated that only around half of respondents would participate in the defence of the country if attacked. Of these, 28 per cent declared a readiness to fight with weapons, while the remainder preferred to contribute in support roles such as logistics or healthcare. The data also revealed notable demographic patterns: younger people and men expressed greater willingness to take up arms, whereas support functions attracted a more diverse cross-section of the population. Nevertheless, interest in a professional military career remains minimal. Some 14 per cent of respondents – and nearly one-quarter of young adults – expressed support for short-term military training, but primarily in the fields of first aid and crisis preparedness rather than combat readiness.

Parallel to this, scepticism towards increased defence spending has grown. A declining share of the public favours higher military budgets, while an increasing number view current expenditure as excessive or even irrelevant. These attitudes reflect a deep-seated Czech tradition of neutrality and a persistent disconnect between expert assessments and public perceptions of threat. Whereas security specialists stress the risks of conventional war and the uncertainties facing NATO, most citizens continue to identify terrorism, Islamic extremism, and irregular migration as the primary dangers. Unless the government can effectively persuade the public of the salience of emerging risks, it will face considerable difficulty in sustaining political support for ambitious defence investments.¹⁵

Although survey results inevitably fluctuate over time, they consistently reveal a lack of consensus within Czech society regarding national defence. As the historian Jiří Padevět¹⁶ has suggested, however, such findings may underestimate the depth of latent civic commitment. In his view, in the event of an actual conflict, behavioural patterns could shift considerably, with a far larger share of the population ultimately willing to take part in the defence of the country.

¹² [Výdaje na obranu musí být účelné, nikoli bezhlavé a na úkor občanů](#) [Defense spending must be purposeful, not reckless and at the expense of citizens]. [online] 01 07 2025 Source: SPD.cz [30 09 2025]

¹³ Vladimír VOKÁL: [Konečná: EU je před rozpadem. Prosadíme registraci „zahraničních agentů“ v Česku](#) [Konečná: The EU is on the verge of collapse. We will enforce the registration of 'foreign agents' in the Czech Republic]. [online] 09 09 2025 Source: iDnes [30 09 2025]

¹⁴ [Postoje Čechů k armádě, obraně vlasti a financování obrany](#) [Czechs' attitudes towards the army, national defense, and defense financing]. [online] 27 07 2025 Source: STEM.cz [30 09 2025]

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ [U Kulatého stolu: Šli by Češi bránit v případě napadení svou zemí?](#) [Would the Czechs go to defend their country if it were attacked?]. [online] 2025 Source: YouTube [30 09 2025]



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When considering the limited public interest in defence, it is important to recall that, under existing legislation, conscription in the event of war would apply compulsorily to both men and women aged 18 to 60. Several factors help to explain why survey data nonetheless indicate relatively low willingness to serve. First, the war in Ukraine has laid bare the unvarnished brutality of large-scale conflict. Through television, social media, and the testimonies of returning veterans, the Czech public has been confronted with images of mass casualties, disabled soldiers, trench warfare, chronic stress, sexual violence, and other stark reminders of human cruelty. In contrast to the more sanitised portrayals of limited operations in the Middle East to which many had grown accustomed, these images have made participation in war appear profoundly undesirable.

Second, Czech society has undergone a marked process of demilitarisation since the abolition of compulsory military service in 2004. As Tomáš Kolomazník¹⁷, head of the Centre for Security Consulting in Prague, argued, the termination of conscription two decades ago contributed to the creation of a 'demilitarised society', leaving the country with insufficient active reserves. In light of rising security demands and the lessons of Ukraine, he contends that reintroducing some form of mandatory service – even in shorter formats rather than the former two-year terms – may need to be considered. Kolomazník has further emphasised that Czech society must become more militarised, however politically unpopular that prospect may be, while also stressing that the armed forces would require significant investment in infrastructure, housing, equipment, and training capacity in order to absorb larger intakes. He anticipates that the issue could return to the political agenda within one or two years, depending on the prevailing balance of political will.

Czech reaction towards the new capability targets

Further debate has been fuelled by the introduction of new NATO capability targets, subsequently confirmed at the June summit in The Hague. This summit marked a pivotal moment for the Alliance. MSs agreed to raise defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035, of which 3.5 per cent is earmarked for military budgets and 1.5 per cent for broader security-related domains, including critical infrastructure, cyber defence, and societal resilience. In tandem, NATO adopted a set of ambitious new Capability Targets (CTs), shifting the focus from symbolic spending thresholds to concrete requirements for deployable forces, logistics, preparedness, and societal robustness. This development reflects both the enduring pressures of Russia's war in Ukraine and persistent American demands—particularly those articulated by Donald Trump—for European allies to assume a greater share of the collective burden.

For Czechia, these commitments present unprecedented challenges. Meeting the 5 per cent threshold would necessitate raising defence expenditure from approximately CZK 170 billion in 2024 (the year in which Prague finally achieved the long-standing 2 per cent benchmark) to nearly CZK 600 billion annually by 2035. Such an increase of 250 per cent would impose significant strains on the fiscal framework, forcing uncomfortable trade-offs with other policy priorities and testing public tolerance. Opinion surveys consistently show that Czechs rank among the least supportive publics in NATO when it comes to higher defence spending, often viewing national defence as the responsibility of the Alliance—or of the United States—rather than a primarily national concern. Without a compelling narrative linking these sacrifices to tangible improvements in security, political leaders risk committing to goals that society may ultimately be unwilling to underwrite.¹⁸

Beyond the fiscal dimension, the Czech military faces acute structural constraints, foremost among them personnel. According to the General Staff, the army should reach 37,500–40,000 professional soldiers by 2030, yet as of 2024 it fielded only around 24,000. Recruitment struggles to outpace attrition: roughly 1,850 new recruits join annually, while about 1,300 depart, leaving net growth at just 550 soldiers per year. At this rate, force targets will remain out of reach for decades, far beyond NATO's timelines. Compounding the problem, the budget is disproportionately weighted toward procurement – fighter aircraft, armoured vehicles, tanks, and radar systems – while only 23 per cent is allocated to personnel

¹⁷ [Českou společnost je třeba více militarizovat, říká Kolomazník. Armádě chybí lidé](#) [Czech society needs to be more militarized, says Kolomazník. The army lacks people]. [online] 06 07 2025 Source: TVNova [30 09 2025]

¹⁸ Zdeněk Rod – Miroslav PLUNDRICH: [5% výdaje na obranu a nové capability targets: Jak si stojí Česká republika po červnovém summitu v Haagu?](#) [5% defense spending and new capability targets: How does the Czech Republic stand after the June summit in The Hague?]. [online] 08 07 2025 Source: CZ Defence [30 09 2025]



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and training, markedly below the NATO average of 36 per cent. Absent sufficient manpower, there is a growing risk that expensive acquisitions will amount to little more than 'iron without operators'.¹⁹

However, despite persistent criticism, recruitment figures from 2025 suggest a more positive trajectory. This year, the Czech Army recorded its most successful recruitment drive since the establishment of the professional force. The annual target of 2,100 new soldiers has already been exceeded, with additional intakes scheduled for September and November. In contrast to previous years – when recruitment often fell short or even produced net losses – the army anticipates a net gain of at least 650 soldiers, the strongest increase in five years. Several factors underpin this improvement: a rise in entry-level salaries (now starting at CZK 47,200 – approx. 1900 EUR), expanded recruitment bonuses of up to CZK 90,000 (approx. 3,600 EUR), and the introduction of stabilisation payments. Legislative reforms have also eased entry requirements, while the launch of a modernised recruitment website has generated notable interest, registering over one million visits since its debut. Although retention data will not be available until the year's end, current trends indicate a renewed momentum in reinforcing the personnel base of the Czech Armed Forces.²⁰

Furthermore, infrastructure represents another area of weakness. Czechia has pledged to act as a host nation, facilitating the transit of allied forces to NATO's eastern flank. Yet cumbersome planning procedures, environmental regulations, and inter-ministerial disputes routinely delay the construction of depots, transport hubs, or bases, often by 5–7 years. Without legal reforms and the creation of a strong coordinating authority for defence infrastructure, these commitments risk remaining rhetorical rather than operational.²¹

Finally, interoperability stands as a central challenge within the new CTs. The war in Ukraine has underscored that modern warfare demands not merely advanced weapons, but integrated logistics, communications, medical and humanitarian systems, and cyber capabilities. Realising such integration requires deeper standardisation, robust cross-ministerial coordination, and effective data sharing – domains in which Czech practice still lags behind.²²

In sum, fulfilling NATO's new commitments involves far more than increased spending. It necessitates a wholesale rethinking of the Czech defence model, encompassing recruitment, reserve forces, infrastructure, and public engagement. Without stronger political leadership, comprehensive legal reform, and an open societal debate over the values worth defending, Prague risks making ambitious promises on paper while lacking the means to deliver them. If the Hague summit is to mark a genuine turning point for NATO, it must equally become one for Czech defence policy—moving beyond symbolic targets and procurement spreadsheets toward a sustainable strategy that builds real capabilities, enhances resilience, and secures the trust of its citizens.²³

Military procurements issues

Occasional procurement controversies remain a recurrent feature of Czech defence policy, often centring on the cost or quality of delivered equipment. Among the numerous examples, the most recent debates illustrate the political and institutional sensitivities surrounding military acquisitions.

In June 2025, the parliamentary defence committee considered two contentious cases: the procurement of new field kitchens and the planned acquisition of light attack vehicles. The Ministry of Defence defended the purchase of modern field kitchens – priced at CZK 4.7 million per trailer – on the grounds that existing equipment was obsolete, unhygienic, and no longer compliant with EU standards. Critics, particularly opposition MPs, denounced the prices as excessive, some going so far as to suggest that in wartime school canteens might serve as a cheaper substitute. Defence Minister Jana Černochová responded that earlier governments had neglected modernisation, emphasised that the kitchens would also serve humanitarian purposes, and underscored that contracts were awarded through open tenders.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Oldřich TICHÝ: [Nábor nováčků je letos nejúspěšnější v historii armády](#) [This year's recruitment of new recruits is the most successful in the history of the army]. [online] 27 08 2025 Source: Ministerstvo obrany [30 09 2025]

²¹ ROD – PLUNDRIC, 2025.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.



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She further noted that delayed deliveries would incur penalties and that an internal audit was already underway.²⁴

The committee also examined the planned purchase of 18 Supacat HMT400 vehicles for the special forces. Valued at CZK 1.76 billion (excluding VAT), the deal provoked accusations of overpricing. The ministry clarified that the cost was consistent with that paid by the British Army, with the chassis supplied by the Czech company LPP and integration carried out by the state-owned Military Technical Institute. While some anonymous critics questioned the vehicles' suitability, the Chief of the General Staff maintained that they were urgently required for operational readiness.²⁵

Conclusions

The most consequential event for Czech defence in 2025 will be the parliamentary elections scheduled for October. Current polling suggests that Andrej Babiš's ANO is likely to secure first place, followed by SPOLU under Prime Minister Petr Fiala in second, and Tomio Okamura's SPD in third.²⁶

The central question concerns coalition-building, as any governing majority requires 101 of the 200 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Several scenarios are conceivable. One possibility is an agreement between ANO and Motoristé, a new right-wing party led by Petr Macinka. Given its recent emergence, its political trajectory remains difficult to predict. In its programme, however, Motoristé sobě outlines a vision for national defence that makes security a central priority, while rejecting NATO's new 5 per cent GDP target as economically unfeasible. Instead, the party advocates for more efficient and balanced allocation of resources, emphasising civil defence and critical infrastructure alongside traditional military spending.²⁷ A second possibility would be a coalition between ANO and the far-right SPD. As previously noted, SPD has adopted a sceptical stance towards defence modernisation, and is vocally critical of both NATO and the EU.

Alternatively, there remains the prospect of SPOLU once again forming a coalition with STAN, thereby continuing the current trajectory of defence policy with no major departures.

As this analysis has demonstrated, despite substantial recent efforts, Czech defence continues to confront structural obstacles rooted in decades of underinvestment in the Czech Armed Forces. It is evident that the country's defence posture cannot be transformed overnight. Sustained and balanced investment over the course of at least two decades will be required to consolidate modernisation and resilience. The challenge for Prague is to avoid repeating past patterns of neglect, and to preserve the sense of urgency that Russia's war in Ukraine has instilled.

²⁴ Jan HRBÁČEK: [Je to drahé! Levněji to ale nešlo. Poslanci řešili polní kuchyně a útočná vozidla](#) [It's expensive! But it couldn't be cheaper. The deputies discussed field kitchens and assault vehicles]. [online] 10 06 2025 Source: Ekonomický deník [30 09 2025]

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Petr POHŮDKA: [Volební průzkumy pro volby do Poslanecké sněmovny 2025](#) [Election Polls for the 2025 Chamber of Deputies Elections]. [online] 07 09 2025 Source: E15.cz [30 09 2025]

²⁷ [Volební program 2025](#) [online] 2025 Source: Motoristé sobě [30 09 2025]



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